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Editor’s introduction—This symposium offers the reviews of two authors who, without 
sparing whatever criticism can be mustered, hold her work up as archetypal for rigorous methods 
and theory in plain Anabaptist studies. I have little more to say about Luann Good Gingrich’s 
work than that it is has been long, long in waiting. But let me add just a bit more and say why.  
Now here is a study where a researcher has brought thick theory to interpret meticulously 
collected and presented interview data about a plain Anabaptist group (Old Colony Mennonites) 
in the context of broader forces. Yet, with her findings, she rejects the classic pattern in Amish 
and plain Anabaptist studies to engage in topical incest; instead, she pollinates larger theory with 
new life. Situated in social work, Good Gingrich’s research has broad implications for the social 
sciences, both for strengthening Bourdieu’s theories and in bringing into focus from the Old 
Colony Mennonite case the inherent contradictions in the Canadian welfare and market system. 
Good Gingrich’s investigation of these Mennonites is fresh food for thought, instantly palatable, 
to the hungry scholar in Amish and plain Anabaptist studies. For one, she avoids the long-rooted 
dichotomy of insider/outsider and instead explores the permanent temporality of separatist 
Mennonites engaging the world (and vice versa), an umbrella for many other suspended 
contradictions in both Mennonite and state habituses and fields. The Mennonites are, ultimately, 
socially excluded (marginally included) by both self-imposition and the Canadian social field. 
Her work should be emulated in at least three ways. First, transcribed quotes are 
extensive. Not only are the conclusions drawn from data verifiable in the text but her respondents 
are given voice far beyond the small snippets—or even absence—of voice in most other 
monographs about plain people. Second, she feels no obligation to entertain the readers with 
factoids and descriptive passages about Old Colony Mennonites, but, after presenting necessary 
data and background, moves for a page—or even pages—into theorizing that may make little to 
no direct mention of Mennonites. Her focus is broadly conceptual and purposive, not a stream of 
Mennonite trivia. Finally, her conclusions are cautious and, ultimately, inconclusive, far from the 
boastful, publicity-conscious, definitive-sympathetic-authoritative-comprehensive study of an 
insider. The study opens more questions than answers, inviting other scholars to contribute. 
—Cory Anderson, editor, Journal of Amish and Plain Anabaptist Studies 
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Review #1: Jeffrey Longhofer, Professor of Social Work, Rutgers University 
I am not prone to sycophantic hyperbole in reviewing books. I try my best to find the 
ground somewhere between the freshly tilled soil and the deep roots and often I expose a place 
where the author has not probed deeply enough, into the data or into the fit between theory and 
data. Luann Good Gingrich is an exception. Few scholars accomplish what she has in making 
nuanced moves among macro social theory, psychological theory (i.e., object relations), and the 
experience-near sites of social exclusion and suffering. This is a scrupulous consideration of the 
forces shaping the interactions among the recipients of social welfare services, clients and 
communities, and their unique social positioning as they circumnavigate national boundaries, 
shifting neoliberal state projects, privatization of social services, managerialism, and sometimes 
intersecting and conflicting identities (of welfare workers and clients). With concepts from 
Bourdieu—habitus, social field, and capital—and her carefully crafted moves between the macro 
and micro, what she has accomplished in her book is nothing short of spectacular. And she does 
so without losing the singularity of the human experience. For example, during her research, as 
she reflects on her Mennonite history and habitus, she acknowledges her own singularity. This 
she accomplishes by fully recognizing and engaging countertransference with her subjects, and 
by refraining from the use of her own identity as a condition for engagement, by avoiding what 
Bourdieu called the scholastic fallacy. 
And while she does not use or cite Bourdieu’s work on the scholastic fallacy, she 
accomplishes precisely what Bourdieu describes as reflexive practice: the researcher, the 
“objectifying subject,” must objectify their own practices. She writes that a truly reflexive 
practice compels “researchers, professional helpers, or concerned citizens to consider the ways in 
which we think and talk about people and the social problems as if we occupy a place outside, as 
if we have no place in this social world that we are trying to articulate” (p. 63). Her work makes 
a major contribution to the often experience-distant accounts of habit and reflexivity in social 
work practice (Berger 2015; D’Cruz, et al. 2007a; D’Cruz, et al. 2007b).  
Throughout her work, Gingrich interrogates the mostly hidden assumptions that produce 
and reproduce social work practice methods, assign significance to social problems, valorize 
particular interventions and research, and prescribe research methods and representation of 
findings. Good Gingrich offers us an exceptional, experience-near account of how the social field 
of social work’s hidden assumptions requires a social science of social work research practice. 
Good Gingrich, moreover, avoids the tendency, common among those oversubscribed to 
Bourdieu’s thinking, to assign undue importance to habit and thereby fail to account for the many 
ways practitioners monitor and scrutinize acquired practice habits. It’s too bad that she did not 
read and develop a conversation with Jerry Floersh’s (2002) important work on what he called, 
and she also calls, the “helper habitus,” and his earlier work on reading the case record, both 
important contributions to our understandings of how social work practice is both subject to the 
formation of the practice habitus and also forms of resistance to it (Floersch 2000). 
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Bernard Lahire (2003), perhaps the most important and sympathetic of Bourdieu’s critics, 
would find in this work a reasonable corrective to what he sees as Bourdieu’s conceptual erasure 
of singularity and problematic understanding of reflexivity. And among the less sympathetic of 
Bourdieu’s critics, Margaret Archer (2010) would also find here a significant move toward 
resolving what she calls the problem of central conflation: the collapse of subjectivity and 
objectivity “so that agents and structures lose their relative autonomy.” 
The Old Colony Mennonites offer to Gingrich a way not only of thinking about the 
complexities of mobility and migration and the various scenes of cultural collision. Canada, the 
site of her research, is also a place where she explores in detail—using and considering the 
complexities and many contradictions produced by Canadian exceptionalism—how cultural 
identities and help seeking behaviors are a matter less of ethnographic fact than of political 
contestation. Old Colony Mennonite immigrants from Latin America are used to explore not the 
exotic and quaint but how imagined communities, Canadian and Mennonite, are in uncertain and 
unstable states. Her work shows us how welfare states, welfare state actors, and human service 
actions lack unity, unless determined by particular unifying historical conditions. Likewise, she 
shows how in their forms of resistance, immigrants—communal and individual—also lack unity. 
Finally, modes and ethics of caring—i.e., human services, delivered by state and non-state 
actors—will also be largely determined by a lack of unity and the disorder found in late capitalist 
societies.  
Especially notable is the way Good Gingrich conceptualizes social exclusion. Social 
work practitioners and researchers will need to read Good Gingrich to deepen their 
understanding of social exclusion. Here, Good Gingrich is worth quoting at length: 
The application of social exclusion as an individual kind through a categorical perspective, fixed on its 
material outcomes, reinforces and perpetuates the common sense belief that those who suffer the 
social ills of society—poverty, unemployment, inadequate housing—collude intentionally or 
unwittingly in their own economic and social hardship. (p. 56) 
Finally, let me note my great worry about this work. I fear that it will not be discovered 
by social work researchers and those interested in the complex forms welfare states take in the 
neoliberal era. The title of the book, Out of Place: Social Exclusion and Mennonite Migrants in 
Canada, does not begin to describe the true nature of this work. Likewise, I fear this work will 
be read mainly by scholars with an interest in Anabaptist communities and history. And they too 
may find this work outside the scope of their usual interests.  
Review #2: Steven Reschly, Professor of History, Truman State University 
“[M]igration is about preserving, even as it threatens to destroy” (p. 174; emphasis in 
original). Luann Good Gingrich, Associate Professor of Social Work at York University in 
Toronto, investigated the paradoxes of migration in Out of Place. However, her research is far 
more nuanced than a simple binary of success or failure. The book interweaves the stories and 
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experiences of Old Colony Mennonites in Canada and Latin America, the “reflexive sociology” 
of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002), and the social services institutions and 
practices as they have existed and shifted in Canada in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries. Even more generally, the book is about social exclusion and inclusion, the neoliberal 
political economy, the fusion of market and state in late capitalism, and the invention and 
persistence of unequal distribution of capital, in all its forms, in global populations. In this 
complex matrix, Old Colony Mennonites are “both unique and typical” (p. 25), as they represent 
numerous “insiders” and “outsiders” all over the world, marking this study as both local and 
global, both particular to specific times and places and representative of global trends in 
economics, labor markets, migrations, and inequities. Tracking all these topics makes the read 
difficult, but rich and rewarding. 
Obligatory disclaimers and observations: It is important for JAPAS readers to understand 
that Out of Place is not a book about Old Colony Mennonites, in the sense of an anthropological 
ethnography. I know precious little about Old Colony Mennonites or the Russian Mennonite 
groups and traditions more generally. I know even less about Canadian politics, economics, and 
systems of social services. Like many scholars in the English-language world, I used parts of 
Bourdieu’s research and theoretical writings in my dissertation and resultant book, The Amish on 
the Iowa Prairie (2000). My own research experience is situated in Anabaptist groups from the 
Swiss, South German, and Alsace-Lorraine regions of Central Europe. Despite—or perhaps 
because of—these caveats and limitations, I learned a great deal by reading Out of Place. 
“Intersectionality,” a current catchword not used in the book, certainly describes the experience 
of working through its many layers and connectivities. 
Writing a summary, per a normal book review, of Out of Place is nearly impossible; that 
is, to condense adequately and fairly its several component parts. My impression is that the 
author had enough material for at least five books. Instead, it may take five readings—for me at 
least—to digest its content. The present volume represents nearly 20 years of research and 
reflection, distilled into one dense and intense tome. The author described her hesitancy in 
publishing information about a group that prefers to remain private and separate, in the 
Acknowledgements as well as in Chapter 1 (pp. xix 20-22), hence some resulting delay in 
publication. Since others were, and are, publishing about plain groups in general and Old Colony 
Mennonites specifically, she realized that not publishing would not protect their privacy. Good 
Gingrich included many Old Colony voices from her own field notes, transcriptions of 
interviews by translators and other researchers, as well as voices of social service personnel. On 
the other hand, further research may be stymied by increasing resistance from informants who 
believe they are being intruded upon and misrepresented (pp. 229-30, note 32). I wonder if the 
Mexican feature film, “Silent Light,” and the recent Canadian Broadcasting Corporation TV 
series, “Pure,” could be playing a role in this hesitancy. In any case, there is a maturity and 
wisdom in Out of Place that one seldom finds in a writing that began life as a dissertation. 
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Good Gingrich defined terms with great care. “Dietsch” (noun) and “Dietsche” (noun and 
adjective) refer to Old Colony migrants between and among Canada and Latin American 
countries (Deutsch and Deutsche/deutsche in High German). These terms are partially derived 
from the language, “Plautdietsch” or Low German (Plattdeutsch in High German), and partially 
derived from an intention to differentiate the author’s research from other recent terminologies, 
such as Altkolonier, Kanadier, “Mexican Mennonites,” and horse-and-buggy Mennonites. 
(Im)migrant is intended to represent the complexities of migration—emigration, immigration, 
“circular migration,” return migration, and other types of global population relocation. The 
author meant (im)migration “to signify the Dietsche Mennonite supranational disposition” (p. 
18), that is, Dietsche habits of movement, nearly assumptions that migrations will be part of their 
lives. (The discussion of terminologies takes place on pages 15-19 and the associated notes on 
pages 227-28, notes 19-24.) “Disposition” will require further thought as Habitus. 
Good Gingrich made extensive and sophisticated use of the theory and research praxis of 
Pierre Bourdieu, represented most efficiently by the phrase “reflexive sociology.” The researcher 
must situate him/herself within the research, such that the subject-object binary, or the we-they 
and self-other differentiations, become “we.” As the author stated, citing Bourdieu, researching 
the social world “must involve recognition that we are seeing and theorizing ourselves” (p. 63). 
In fact, Out of Place is a rare English-language example of doing Bourdieusian sociology. There 
are many publications that explain Bourdieu’s sociology methods and theories, and many (like 
my own) that use selected parts of Bourdieu’s ideas but almost none that do research that is 
theorized and that develop theory supported specifically by empirical research. The only ones I 
know of are the works of French-American Loïc J. D. Wacquant, Bourdieu’s colleague, 
collaborator, and mediator to the English-speaking world. Good Gingrich cited Wacquant—and 
co-authored works by Bourdieu with Wacquant—quite often, though not nearly as often as 
Bourdieu himself. See An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992). 
Habitus, Field, and Capital are essential terms to read Bourdieu and, therefore, to read 
Out of Place. Bourdieu rejected the common binaries that bedevil social theory: internal-
external, idealism-materialism, individual-society, self-other, structuralism-functionalism, 
sacred-profane, left-right, insider-outsider, and many others. Thus, Habitus (the habits of mind, 
the inner world of human beings, or dispositions) and Field (the external, social world) are 
mutually influential. In Bourdieu’s terms, this is “the internalisation of externality and the 
externalisation of internality,” or the “mutual penetration” of “structuralist constructivism” and 
“constructivist structuralism” (quoted p. 66). I used Habitus and field in historical research and 
began to despair of those terms finding wider acceptance; I thus proposed “structured intuition” 
for Habitus and “intuitive structuring” for field. After reading this book, I may wish to return to 
Bourdieu’s original terms. I made little use of capital, which has a large presence in Out of Place. 
Capital takes economic, social, and cultural forms, resulting in “symbolic capital,” all of which 
position persons and groups in the social field. Differential access to and possession of capital 
results in hierarchical inequality as persons and groups are labeled “insider” or “outsider” in the 
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social field. Bourdieu was interested in the creation and application of power, especially 
symbolic or hidden power that is more powerful for being virtually and intentionally invisible. 
One reads “cultural capital” and “social capital” in writings focused on Plain communities, as 
well as in studies of education and other disciplines, but taken out of a Bourdieusian context, 
they are essentially meaningless terms. 
Good Gingrich demonstrated that Dietsche, as well as other marginal persons and 
groups, are often forced into a liminal, in-between (entredeux) existence, torn socially and within 
themselves by fidelity to colony traditions—such as mutuality, language, placing community 
ahead of individual, and so forth—and the competitive individualism of the neoliberal market-
state, based on wage labor and conformity to atomized economics. She makes an interesting 
distinction between “making a living”—which may mean for Dietsche piecing together many 
different seasonal agricultural jobs in Ontario in which many family members earn cash income 
in an “informal economy,” sometimes wintering in Mexico, for example—and “wage labor”—
which separates families, isolates women, and leaves children uninvolved or in school, perhaps 
too much school. She utilized a late-career concept from Bourdieu, “divided Habitus” or “cleft 
Habitus” (the latter I find to be a particularly striking phrase), that is, Dietsche may find 
themselves separated from colony and church, from distant extended family members, from 
members of their own nuclear families, and even from parts of themselves. Choosing English 
over Plautdietsch is but one example. These choices are imposed by the social welfare system as 
it changes in Canada toward neoliberal ideologies, such as individualism, market economics, and 
limited government. As welfare services become more constricted, marginal persons and groups 
receive less assistance to include themselves in Canadian society and thus find themselves 
excluded, or they find it more difficult to choose freely to remain separate in a more communal 
lifestyle. 
Defining and describing these “double binds” of dispossession and alienation can result 
in exceedingly complex language. I had to read many sentences and paragraphs several times, 
and will need to read them again. This is not a criticism. My sense is that, similar to reading 
German philosophy or other French social and linguistic theorists, the complexity of the 
language is necessary to signify the discourses of intricate, ambiguous, paradoxical, contested, 
and byzantine ideas in the operations of social and cultural power. These writers make few 
concessions to what passes for “popular” tastes for the hoi polloi. 
As a historian, the best compliment I can offer is that Out of Place caused me to think of 
many other historical processes: industrialization and the gendered separation of home and 
workplace, and thus the creation of the “housewife,” but only for certain classes and races; the 
writings of E. P. Thompson and the shift from task-oriented work to industrial timed and 
disciplined wage labor; immigration historiography and the assimilation paradigm (many 
migrant groups moved to conserve, “transplanted” rather than “uprooted”); the internalization of 
colonization by the colonized described by Frantz Fanon; the contingent historical invention of 
the nation-state, as in Eugen Weber’s Peasants into Frenchmen (1976); creating the welfare and 
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warfare state in the first half of the twentieth century, now being intentionally dismantled (well, 
the welfare side), as traced by Good Gingrich; the neoliberal paradigm shift led by Reagan, 
Thatcher, and their successors; the recurrent transfer of wealth toward the already wealth and the 
greater impoverishment of the already poor in nearly all of human history; the dominance of 
agriculture and the recent changes to industrial and then to service/information political 
economies; and many other enduring questions and issues. Some of this longer historical 
perspective could have been included in the book, but it seems petty to ask for even more from 
such a productive piece of research. Perhaps it is no accident that this book shares its title with 
Edward Said’s memoir (1999); like the Dietsche, persistently between cultures and nations. 
I should note that I am not including the final chapter on “Social Inclusion” in this 
review. When juxtaposed with the rest of the book, it seems moralistic and prescriptive, even as I 
wholeheartedly agree with the necessity to be “tenaciously subversive” in the (quixotic?) quest to 
overcome the “systems of values and beliefs” (p. 220) that characterize the neoliberal market-
state. Working toward reconciliation and “restorative justice” (p. 247 n. 6) seems a prototypical 
Anabaptist assumption of permanent minority standing, whereas in the rest of the book, Good 
Gingrich worked very hard to position the Dietsche narrative in Canadian national and provincial 
political economies. 
Out of Place illustrates the potential rewards of situating minority histories and 
sociologies in national and global histories, and of utilizing national and global histories to 
contextualize minority and subaltern histories. Following Bourdieu in his rejection of binary 
habits of scholarship, scholars of Anabaptist and plain communities can benefit from situating 
the local in the global and making global trends specific in localities. Another binary that needs 
to be left behind, for example, is the false choice between viewing Amish communities as 
constructed solely upon their history and theology, no matter what the social and political 
contexts may be; and, on the other hand, viewing the Amish as mired in constant struggle with 
external technological forces, while disregarding the impact of their historical experience and 
religious beliefs. 
The theory and praxis of Pierre Bourdieu surely offers one solution to these scholarly cul-
de-sacs, but no one is arguing that he is the only way out. Good Gingrich, to her credit, cited 
many other writers and scholars, for example, in tracing the development of neoliberalism and its 
operations in the early decades of the twenty-first century. Her dominant muse, and thus the 
dominant theorist in this review, was Bourdieu. Finding routes out of the isolated and insulated 
world of plain scholarship is critical. Here’s hoping that many more scholars will follow Good 
Gingrich’s lead in researching the chronically undertheorized branches of plain Anabaptist 
studies. 
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Reply by Luann Good Gingrich: More Thoughts on Reflexivity 
It seems that serious engagement with theory has fallen out of fashion, even in the 
academy, as scholars are pushed to develop “university-industry partnerships” and to produce 
neatly packaged and marketable “outputs.” Theory development does not lend itself to simple 
policy and practice “innovations.” Over the years, as I have presented my work on social 
exclusion at dozens of academic conferences, my 15 or 20 minute presentations have been 
consistently met with voyeuristic curiosity about the case example (Dietsche communities), and 
the theory often falls flat. So to begin, I wish to express my deep appreciation to Cory Anderson 
for initiating this scholarly conversation. I’m also very grateful to the two reviewers, Jeffrey 
Longhofer and Steven Reschley, for the respect and intentionality with which they engaged my 
work. This is indeed high praise. 
Surely a book provides extended opportunity and encouragement for others to engage in 
the theory—the focus of my work—yet finding words to invite the reader in, language for 
storytelling, was a constant challenge in my writing. I was aware of trying to “trick” the reader 
into theory—to take the reader by the hand, to point out what is there to see and learn beneath the 
surface of common preconceptions and beyond the peculiar “otherness” of the people in the 
story. Honoring both the people and the theory was also a struggle for me in naming the book. 
Titles are difficult—reductionist, almost certainly. I take Longhofer’s point that the title “does 
not begin to describe the true nature of this work.” Yet, I was also aiming to catch the attention of 
various audiences—practitioners, academics, students, even curious “lay” people. This continues 
to be a perplexing problem for scholars, I think—to engage in conversations beyond ourselves, to 
move outside of the “scientific ‘community’ defined by its commitment to objectivity, probity, 
and a presumed independence from worldly interests,” to accept the risks of investing “artistic or 
scientific competency in civic debates” (Bourdieu 2003, 18). But if ever there was a time for the 
“public intellectual,” it is now.  
Just as Out of Place went to press and became available (the summer of 2016), alarming 
social and political shifts all across the world were coming to light, renewing my resolve to 
invite us to think differently about ourselves in relation to the “other” we identify in our 
everyday lives. Since then, we have witnessed the rising popularity of openly xenophobic ideals 
expressed by populist movements led by (ironically) wealthy elite who dismiss the resentments 
they manipulate. All across the globe, people who identify with the conservative right and the 
liberal left are inscribing hard and fast lines demarcating “them” from “us”. To simply condemn 
these rising leaders and their followers is to respond in kind. Furthermore, “to indict anti-
intellectualism […] does not exempt the intellectual from this critique to which every intellectual 
can and must submit himself or herself or, in another language, from reflexivity, which is the 
absolute prerequisite to any political action by intellectuals. The intellectual world must engage 
in a permanent critique of all the abuses of power or authority committed in the name of 
intellectual authority […]” (Bourdieu 2003, 19).  
266  Journal of Amish and Plain Anabaptist Studies 5(2) 
 
The thoughtful and informative reviews of my work inspired me to consider again Pierre 
Bourdieu’s reflexivity, in particular the epistemic reflexivity that is crucial to rigorous and 
truthful social research. I have chosen to focus the remainder of my response on these 
reflections. 
If we are to take seriously the project of reflexivity, as Bourdieu suggests, we will be 
compelled to pay attention to those who breathe life into growing populist movements. Almost 
20 years ago, in a provocative reflexive consideration of the Christian church, Old Testament 
theologian Walter Brueggemann posits the “coming of exile with the loss of Jerusalem” as a 
close analogue for our time, and offers these rather prophetic words: 
For the truth is that Western culture as we have counted on it is in a serious state of collapse […] 
Specifically, old modes of power, old patterns of certitude – liberal and conservative – and old claims 
of privilege on which we commonly count are in deep jeopardy[…]. Ours is a like loss, concrete and 
political, religious and symbolic, wherein the old, white male privilege of the West is gone, and we are 
in a season of displacement and wilderness […]. I believe the consequence of such loss, moreover, is 
enormous rage, which shows up variously in family abuse, in absurd armament programs and budgets, 
in abusive prison policies, in passion for capital punishment, and assaults upon the poor in the name of 
“reform”. All of these, I submit, are displaced practices of anger that end in brutality. (Brueggemann 
2000, 36; 61) 
The public intellectual of today will only add fuel to these raging fires unless we 
acknowledge the grievances of those for whom our institutions and social systems have never 
worked, those who are left with little more than empty promises, those from whom our own 
privilege and certitude and domination was stolen. Reflexivity requires us to accept our intimate 
connection with and investment in “these old realities of certitude, privilege, and domination” 
(Brueggemann 2000, 59).  
Bourdieu’s concept of reflexivity is commonly drained of meaning, rendering its 
application in research to a rather awkward contemplative introspection and self-disclosure of the 
researcher’s “internal conversations” or deliberations over one’s social place and personal 
concerns. To reiterate the obvious, Pierre Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology is the study of 
practice—not beliefs, or motivations, or intentions. Indeed, these internal ruminations, variously 
available to conscious thought, remain beyond the reach of empirical research or even self-
reflection. The best we can do is to examine representations (or stories) of beliefs, motivations, 
or intentions, which are always contaminated with relational interests and investments. The 
subjective cannot be considered outside of or apart from the social context in which it is 
engaged. Similarly, it seems all too common to selectively take up Bourdieu’s concepts (capital, 
social field, habitus) as if they retain their depth of meaning when taken apart. This piecemeal 
approach generates false cognitive divides between agency and structure, between the micro and 
the macro, between the subjective and the material. It is tempting to rupture the individual from 
the social, as this permits neat and manageable compartments of thought that comply with the 
binary fallacies of market individualism. Even more, the ironic “neoliberalisation” of Bourdieu’s 
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epistemic reflexivity feeds the social and cognitive divides promoted by popular ideological 
trends such as identity politics, the politics of victimhood, and, what Bourdieu refers to as, a 
“narcissistic reflexivity that is celebrated by some ‘postmodern’ writers, for which the analytical 
gaze turns back on to the private person of the analyst” (Wacquant 2007, 273). Such narcissistic 
reflexivity denies or disavows the very essence of the self as a social being, as necessarily and 
inherently engaged in social relations of power. 
I am aware that these reflections on reflexivity may seem to echo the “moralistic and 
prescriptive” tone, according to Reschly, of the final chapter of my book. This chapter, in large 
part, was written in response to the question “So what?” with which I was first confronted in my 
doctoral oral exam. Perhaps this is a fair and necessary question for scholars, especially for 
theorists whose primary objective is to influence, in some way, common understandings through 
analysis of what is. After all the analysis, so what? Sometimes, maybe even most times, I am of 
the opinion that robust critical reflexive analysis is enough, because it pushes us to see and know 
and understand ourselves and our place in the physical and social world with more honesty, 
humility, and compassion. In this case, because I drew on a social “problem” to develop the 
theory, I felt some pressure, primarily from practitioners, to say something about how to solve 
the “problem.” This turn away from analysis toward synthesis risks jettisoning a Bourdieusian 
framework, especially, as is common, when one orthodoxy is traded in for another. In my 
defense, I wish to be explicit about my objectives and efforts in this chapter, following Reschly’s 
specific critiques.  
First, Reschly comments, “Working toward reconciliation and ‘restorative justice’ seems 
a prototypical Anabaptist assumption of permanent minority standing.” Here, I am reminded of 
the danger of using commonplace language to communicate uncommon ideas. I hasten to clarify 
that the term “reconciliation” is not used to signal restorative justice practices in criminal courts 
or Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) contexts. Although these reconciliation processes are 
important and promising in some ways, these efforts are specifically geared toward reconciling 
an individual or group that has been wronged with those responsible for wrongdoing. This is the 
reconciliation of victims and offenders, and requires us to know who’s who. In Canada, although 
the TRC has encouraged listening and some recognition of past wrongs since its initiation in 
2008, the process thus far has changed little in our ongoing relationships with Indigenous 
peoples. This is the perpetuation of social exclusion, in my opinion: to offer some symbolic 
capital (or recognition), but only as victims, which functions to reinforce the devaluation of 
possessed cultural and political capital. Indigenous peoples are made visible and drawn inside, 
but to devalued and dispossessed places. This sort of reconciliation is little more than re-
colonization. So I insist that I do not relegate Dietsche to minority or victim positions, as Reschly 
asserts. This would undo much of the analysis of the book and would return us to a 
commonsense binary “vision of divisions.” Rather, I am referring to the reconciling of social 
divides and the healing of fractured relationships that involve all of us, not only Mennonites.  
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Yet I argue that Mennonites as Anabaptists do take up minority status, with intention, but 
not by my doing. (I note that Statistics Canada lists “Mennonite” as an ethnic minority category 
in some of their national surveys, such as the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics.) The 
Anabaptists of the sixteenth century were radicals in their challenge of the dominant political and 
social structures of the day. They stubbornly practiced self-imposed social exclusion, as do plain 
Mennonite and Anabaptist groups today. However, my point is that a minority identity does not 
need to represent lesser. This is critical to my analysis: difference can be valued, must be valued, 
to keep limits on extremism and to move us toward healthier relationships, communities, 
societies.  
Finally, my main objective in the final chapter is to draw attention to a counter-cultural 
(or counter-hegemonic) worldview—to remind the reader that market logic is not all there is, 
even though it is everywhere and is our common sense. Given that market logic is profoundly 
moralistic and prescriptive in its own terms, and functions to dismiss and devalue all that 
challenges it, such a principled (even moralistic) standpoint is necessary. If my urgings to look to 
spaces of exclusion for inspiration are taken up as prescriptive, however, I have been 
misunderstood. To the contrary, my aim is to help the reader identify counter-hegemonic 
worldviews with which they are familiar. So I do not prescribe a specific moral imperative or 
ideology—I only argue that those who challenge our sensibilities and expectations around 
“fitting in” and conformity (such as Dietsche) offer a critique of dominant norms and ideals (the 
way things are) that is worth careful and respectful consideration. To recognize that we have a 
worldview that is not the only way to view the world requires being confronted with something 
different. Indigenous peoples, disenfranchised youth, even fundamentalists and extremists (on 
the right and the left) offer counter-point to the prevailing “vision of division” that has wrought 
the social and environmental crises we now face. “We” have much to learn from those we often 
judge most harshly. If we understand poverty, social exclusion, to be fractured relationships in 
need of healing, and if we understand the need to “restore” the essential social nature of 
humanity in our thinking and ways of being, then alternative worldviews are necessary. The “cult 
of the individual and ‘individualism’, the basis of the whole of neoliberal economic thinking” 
(Bourdieu 2005, 11) will not get us there. I attempt to nurture a reflexive posture, with full 
awareness that “our” way—the “Canadian” or “American” way—is not necessarily better, or 
right, or even normal, and does not work for everyone, maybe no longer even for “us.” 
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